| Message ID | 20180128221510.13722-1-richard.henderson@linaro.org |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
| Series | linux-user: Use *at functions to implement interp_prefix | expand |
Hi,
This series seems to have some coding style problems. See output below for
more information:
Type: series
Message-id: 20180128221510.13722-1-richard.henderson@linaro.org
Subject: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] linux-user: Use *at functions to implement interp_prefix
=== TEST SCRIPT BEGIN ===
#!/bin/bash
BASE=base
n=1
total=$(git log --oneline $BASE.. | wc -l)
failed=0
git config --local diff.renamelimit 0
git config --local diff.renames True
commits="$(git log --format=%H --reverse $BASE..)"
for c in $commits; do
echo "Checking PATCH $n/$total: $(git log -n 1 --format=%s $c)..."
if ! git show $c --format=email | ./scripts/checkpatch.pl --mailback -; then
failed=1
echo
fi
n=$((n+1))
done
exit $failed
=== TEST SCRIPT END ===
Updating 3c8cf5a9c21ff8782164d1def7f44bd888713384
From https://github.com/patchew-project/qemu
t [tag update] patchew/1516620999-25669-1-git-send-email-wei.w.wang@intel.com -> patchew/1516620999-25669-1-git-send-email-wei.w.wang@intel.com
t [tag update] patchew/20171215171655.7818-1-dgilbert@redhat.com -> patchew/20171215171655.7818-1-dgilbert@redhat.com
t [tag update] patchew/20180124130126.20871-1-f4bug@amsat.org -> patchew/20180124130126.20871-1-f4bug@amsat.org
* [new tag] patchew/20180128221510.13722-1-richard.henderson@linaro.org -> patchew/20180128221510.13722-1-richard.henderson@linaro.org
Switched to a new branch 'test'
df5366a6ba linux-user: Use *at functions to implement interp_prefix
=== OUTPUT BEGIN ===
Checking PATCH 1/1: linux-user: Use *at functions to implement interp_prefix...
ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition
#189: FILE: linux-user/syscall.c:8372:
+ if (!(fn = lock_user_string(arg2))) {
ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition
#207: FILE: linux-user/syscall.c:8393:
+ if (!(fn = lock_user_string(arg1))) {
ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition
#222: FILE: linux-user/syscall.c:8405:
+ if (!(fn = lock_user_string(arg2))) {
ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition
#303: FILE: linux-user/syscall.c:9808:
+ if (!(fn = lock_user_string(arg1))) {
ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition
#318: FILE: linux-user/syscall.c:9820:
+ if (!(fn = lock_user_string(arg1))) {
ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition
#336: FILE: linux-user/syscall.c:10922:
+ if (!(fn = lock_user_string(arg1))) {
ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition
#353: FILE: linux-user/syscall.c:10936:
+ if (!(fn = lock_user_string(arg1))) {
ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition
#371: FILE: linux-user/syscall.c:10962:
+ if (!(fn = lock_user_string(arg2))) {
ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition
#390: FILE: linux-user/syscall.c:11966:
+ if (!(fn = lock_user_string(arg2))) {
total: 9 errors, 0 warnings, 349 lines checked
Your patch has style problems, please review. If any of these errors
are false positives report them to the maintainer, see
CHECKPATCH in MAINTAINERS.
=== OUTPUT END ===
Test command exited with code: 1
---
Email generated automatically by Patchew [http://patchew.org/].
Please send your feedback to patchew-devel@freelists.org
On 28 January 2018 at 22:15, Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> wrote: > From: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> > > If the interp_prefix is a complete chroot, it may have a *lot* of files. > Setting up the cache for this is quite expensive. > > For the most part, we can use the *at versions of various syscalls to > attempt the operation in the prefix. For the few cases that remain, > use faccessat and create the full path on demand. > > Cc: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> > Cc: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> > Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> > --- > > Changes since v3 (Dec 29 2017): > * Use DO/WHILE as the control construct; wrap it in a macro. > * Introduce linux_user_path to handle the cases *at syscalls > do not cover. > > Changes since v2 (Dec 4 2017): > * Use IF as the control construct instead of SWITCH. > > Changes since v1 (Nov 2016): > * Require interp_dirfd set before trying the *at path. > > > r~ > > --- > linux-user/qemu.h | 15 ++++++ > linux-user/elfload.c | 5 +- > linux-user/main.c | 36 +++++++++++++- > linux-user/syscall.c | 130 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- > 4 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/linux-user/qemu.h b/linux-user/qemu.h > index 4edd7d0c08..5b621f26e0 100644 > --- a/linux-user/qemu.h > +++ b/linux-user/qemu.h > @@ -437,8 +437,23 @@ void mmap_fork_start(void); > void mmap_fork_end(int child); > > /* main.c */ > +extern int interp_dirfd; > extern unsigned long guest_stack_size; > > +#define CHOOSE_INTERP(RET, PATH, OPENAT_EXPR, NORMAL_EXPR) \ > + do { \ > + if (interp_dirfd >= 0 && PATH[0] == '/') { \ > + RET = OPENAT_EXPR; \ > + if (!(RET < 0 && errno == ENOENT)) { \ > + break; \ > + } \ > + } \ > + RET = NORMAL_EXPR; \ > + } while (0) > + > +const char *linux_user_path(const char *); > +#define path(x) linux_user_path(x) > + > /* user access */ > > #define VERIFY_READ 0 > diff --git a/linux-user/elfload.c b/linux-user/elfload.c > index 32a47674e6..1fb097e30d 100644 > --- a/linux-user/elfload.c > +++ b/linux-user/elfload.c > @@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ > > #include "qemu.h" > #include "disas/disas.h" > -#include "qemu/path.h" > > #ifdef _ARCH_PPC64 > #undef ARCH_DLINFO > @@ -2204,7 +2203,9 @@ static void load_elf_interp(const char *filename, struct image_info *info, > { > int fd, retval; > > - fd = open(path(filename), O_RDONLY); > + CHOOSE_INTERP(fd, filename, > + openat(interp_dirfd, filename + 1, O_RDONLY), > + open(filename, O_RDONLY)); > if (fd < 0) { > goto exit_perror; > } > diff --git a/linux-user/main.c b/linux-user/main.c > index 2140465709..8f4087d508 100644 > --- a/linux-user/main.c > +++ b/linux-user/main.c > @@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ > > #include "qapi/error.h" > #include "qemu.h" > -#include "qemu/path.h" > #include "qemu/config-file.h" > #include "qemu/cutils.h" > #include "qemu/help_option.h" > @@ -98,8 +97,41 @@ unsigned long reserved_va; > static void usage(int exitcode); > > static const char *interp_prefix = CONFIG_QEMU_INTERP_PREFIX; > +int interp_dirfd; > const char *qemu_uname_release; > > +const char *linux_user_path(const char *pathname) > +{ > + static THREAD size_t save_len; > + static THREAD char *save_buf; I think THREAD is a remnant of when we used to support configuration with and without NPTL, so we should be looking to get rid of it, and just use __thread instead. > + size_t len, prefix_len, path_len; > + int e; > + > + /* Only consider absolute paths. */ > + if (pathname[0] != '/' || interp_dirfd < 0) { > + return pathname; > + } > + > + /* Test if the path within interp_dir exists. */ > + e = faccessat(interp_dirfd, pathname + 1, F_OK, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW); > + if (e < 0 && errno != ENOENT) { > + return pathname; > + } > + > + /* It does -- form the new absolute path. */ > + prefix_len = strlen(interp_prefix); > + path_len = strlen(pathname) + 1; > + len = prefix_len + path_len; > + if (len <= save_len) { > + save_len = len; > + save_buf = realloc(save_buf, len); > + } > + memcpy(save_buf, interp_prefix, prefix_len); > + memcpy(save_buf + prefix_len, pathname, path_len); > + > + return save_buf; > +} The split of an atomic syscall into a two-part thing involving an existence/access check and then the syscall makes me a bit nervous about races, but I guess there's nothing terrible that would happen here... I had a look at where we still need this function: * NR_acct * NR_statfs (various flavours) * NR_inotify_add_watch For inotify_add_watch, we can first try the syscall on the path inside the interp_dir, and if that fails ENOENT then try it with the normal path. Similarly with NR_acct and the statfs syscalls I think we can do "try the interp_dir path first, then the other if that fails ENOENT". That would allow us to get rid of this function entirely. > + > /* XXX: on x86 MAP_GROWSDOWN only works if ESP <= address + 32, so > we allocate a bigger stack. Need a better solution, for example > by remapping the process stack directly at the right place */ > @@ -4319,7 +4351,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv, char **envp) > memset(&bprm, 0, sizeof (bprm)); > > /* Scan interp_prefix dir for replacement files. */ > - init_paths(interp_prefix); > + interp_dirfd = open(interp_prefix, O_CLOEXEC | O_DIRECTORY | O_PATH); > > init_qemu_uname_release(); I wonder if there are guest programs that make assumptions about file descriptor numbers such that it would be worthwhile dup2'ing the interp_dirfd away from the presumably low number fd it will get by default into something larger... Have you tried an LTP test run with this patchset to see whether we get any new passes/fails ? thanks -- PMM
On 02/13/2018 04:12 AM, Peter Maydell wrote: >> +const char *linux_user_path(const char *pathname) >> +{ >> + static THREAD size_t save_len; >> + static THREAD char *save_buf; > > I think THREAD is a remnant of when we used to support configuration > with and without NPTL, so we should be looking to get rid of it, > and just use __thread instead. Fair. >> + size_t len, prefix_len, path_len; >> + int e; >> + >> + /* Only consider absolute paths. */ >> + if (pathname[0] != '/' || interp_dirfd < 0) { >> + return pathname; >> + } >> + >> + /* Test if the path within interp_dir exists. */ >> + e = faccessat(interp_dirfd, pathname + 1, F_OK, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW); >> + if (e < 0 && errno != ENOENT) { >> + return pathname; >> + } >> + >> + /* It does -- form the new absolute path. */ >> + prefix_len = strlen(interp_prefix); >> + path_len = strlen(pathname) + 1; >> + len = prefix_len + path_len; >> + if (len <= save_len) { >> + save_len = len; >> + save_buf = realloc(save_buf, len); >> + } >> + memcpy(save_buf, interp_prefix, prefix_len); >> + memcpy(save_buf + prefix_len, pathname, path_len); >> + >> + return save_buf; >> +} > > The split of an atomic syscall into a two-part thing involving > an existence/access check and then the syscall makes me a bit > nervous about races, but I guess there's nothing terrible that > would happen here... It's no different from what we have now except that currently the existence check is done *much* earlier. > I had a look at where we still need this function: > * NR_acct > * NR_statfs (various flavours) > * NR_inotify_add_watch > > For inotify_add_watch, we can first try the syscall on the > path inside the interp_dir, and if that fails ENOENT then > try it with the normal path. Fair. >> /* Scan interp_prefix dir for replacement files. */ >> - init_paths(interp_prefix); >> + interp_dirfd = open(interp_prefix, O_CLOEXEC | O_DIRECTORY | O_PATH); >> >> init_qemu_uname_release(); > > I wonder if there are guest programs that make assumptions about > file descriptor numbers such that it would be worthwhile dup2'ing > the interp_dirfd away from the presumably low number fd it will > get by default into something larger... Hmm. Using dup2(probe, probe) to test if the new (high) fd itself has not been allocated? > Have you tried an LTP test run with this patchset to see whether > we get any new passes/fails ? No. All I've really done is point -L at a debian rootfs and see that mainline qemu is unusable in that state. r~
On 02/13/2018 09:31 AM, Richard Henderson wrote: >> I wonder if there are guest programs that make assumptions about >> file descriptor numbers such that it would be worthwhile dup2'ing >> the interp_dirfd away from the presumably low number fd it will >> get by default into something larger... > > Hmm. Using dup2(probe, probe) to test if the new (high) fd itself has not been > allocated? fcntl(F_DUPFD[_CLOEXEC]) is smarter than dup2/3, if you plan on atomically guaranteeing a dup to a not-in-use fd. Will dup'ing to a high fd violate assumptions of programs that assume that open() and friends favor the next available fd by default, rather than having a gap? (Probably not, but skipping fds is not usual, so it's worth asking.) -- Eric Blake, Principal Software Engineer Red Hat, Inc. +1-919-301-3266 Virtualization: qemu.org | libvirt.org
On 13 February 2018 at 16:38, Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> wrote: > On 02/13/2018 09:31 AM, Richard Henderson wrote: >>> >>> I wonder if there are guest programs that make assumptions about >>> file descriptor numbers such that it would be worthwhile dup2'ing >>> the interp_dirfd away from the presumably low number fd it will >>> get by default into something larger... >> >> >> Hmm. Using dup2(probe, probe) to test if the new (high) fd itself has not >> been >> allocated? > > > fcntl(F_DUPFD[_CLOEXEC]) is smarter than dup2/3, if you plan on atomically > guaranteeing a dup to a not-in-use fd. > > Will dup'ing to a high fd violate assumptions of programs that assume that > open() and friends favor the next available fd by default, rather than > having a gap? (Probably not, but skipping fds is not usual, so it's worth > asking.) Well, the idea is that this fd is qemu-internal, so we want the guest to see that from its point of view the first fd it opens will be 3 if it starts with the usual stdin/stdout/stderr. If we don't move it then interp_dirfd gets 3 and the guest sees a "gap" from its POV. (Not being able to hide this qemu-internal fd from the guest properly is the one awkward part of this patch.) OTOH, maybe we should just go ahead without weird games with dup2 and see whether any real code gets confused... thanks -- PMM
On 13 February 2018 at 16:43, Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> wrote: > OTOH, maybe we should just go ahead without weird games with dup2 and > see whether any real code gets confused... Here's some real-world code that would break with this patch as it stands, though dup2 games wouldn't be the fix in this case: https://github.com/xinetd-org/xinetd/blob/master/xinetd/init.c#L79 (it iterates through all fds above 2 closing them, and we don't protect against the guest being able to perform syscalls on interp_dirfd) thanks -- PMM
On 02/13/2018 08:50 AM, Peter Maydell wrote: > On 13 February 2018 at 16:43, Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> wrote: >> OTOH, maybe we should just go ahead without weird games with dup2 and >> see whether any real code gets confused... > > Here's some real-world code that would break with this patch > as it stands, though dup2 games wouldn't be the fix in this case: > https://github.com/xinetd-org/xinetd/blob/master/xinetd/init.c#L79 > > (it iterates through all fds above 2 closing them, and we don't > protect against the guest being able to perform syscalls on > interp_dirfd) Hmm. I suppose we could maintain a fd_set of valid guest fd's, and check every guest operation vs that set. Or special-case interp_dirfd with EBADF. Thoughts before I attempt either? r~
diff --git a/linux-user/qemu.h b/linux-user/qemu.h index 4edd7d0c08..5b621f26e0 100644 --- a/linux-user/qemu.h +++ b/linux-user/qemu.h @@ -437,8 +437,23 @@ void mmap_fork_start(void); void mmap_fork_end(int child); /* main.c */ +extern int interp_dirfd; extern unsigned long guest_stack_size; +#define CHOOSE_INTERP(RET, PATH, OPENAT_EXPR, NORMAL_EXPR) \ + do { \ + if (interp_dirfd >= 0 && PATH[0] == '/') { \ + RET = OPENAT_EXPR; \ + if (!(RET < 0 && errno == ENOENT)) { \ + break; \ + } \ + } \ + RET = NORMAL_EXPR; \ + } while (0) + +const char *linux_user_path(const char *); +#define path(x) linux_user_path(x) + /* user access */ #define VERIFY_READ 0 diff --git a/linux-user/elfload.c b/linux-user/elfload.c index 32a47674e6..1fb097e30d 100644 --- a/linux-user/elfload.c +++ b/linux-user/elfload.c @@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ #include "qemu.h" #include "disas/disas.h" -#include "qemu/path.h" #ifdef _ARCH_PPC64 #undef ARCH_DLINFO @@ -2204,7 +2203,9 @@ static void load_elf_interp(const char *filename, struct image_info *info, { int fd, retval; - fd = open(path(filename), O_RDONLY); + CHOOSE_INTERP(fd, filename, + openat(interp_dirfd, filename + 1, O_RDONLY), + open(filename, O_RDONLY)); if (fd < 0) { goto exit_perror; } diff --git a/linux-user/main.c b/linux-user/main.c index 2140465709..8f4087d508 100644 --- a/linux-user/main.c +++ b/linux-user/main.c @@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ #include "qapi/error.h" #include "qemu.h" -#include "qemu/path.h" #include "qemu/config-file.h" #include "qemu/cutils.h" #include "qemu/help_option.h" @@ -98,8 +97,41 @@ unsigned long reserved_va; static void usage(int exitcode); static const char *interp_prefix = CONFIG_QEMU_INTERP_PREFIX; +int interp_dirfd; const char *qemu_uname_release; +const char *linux_user_path(const char *pathname) +{ + static THREAD size_t save_len; + static THREAD char *save_buf; + size_t len, prefix_len, path_len; + int e; + + /* Only consider absolute paths. */ + if (pathname[0] != '/' || interp_dirfd < 0) { + return pathname; + } + + /* Test if the path within interp_dir exists. */ + e = faccessat(interp_dirfd, pathname + 1, F_OK, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW); + if (e < 0 && errno != ENOENT) { + return pathname; + } + + /* It does -- form the new absolute path. */ + prefix_len = strlen(interp_prefix); + path_len = strlen(pathname) + 1; + len = prefix_len + path_len; + if (len <= save_len) { + save_len = len; + save_buf = realloc(save_buf, len); + } + memcpy(save_buf, interp_prefix, prefix_len); + memcpy(save_buf + prefix_len, pathname, path_len); + + return save_buf; +} + /* XXX: on x86 MAP_GROWSDOWN only works if ESP <= address + 32, so we allocate a bigger stack. Need a better solution, for example by remapping the process stack directly at the right place */ @@ -4319,7 +4351,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv, char **envp) memset(&bprm, 0, sizeof (bprm)); /* Scan interp_prefix dir for replacement files. */ - init_paths(interp_prefix); + interp_dirfd = open(interp_prefix, O_CLOEXEC | O_DIRECTORY | O_PATH); init_qemu_uname_release(); diff --git a/linux-user/syscall.c b/linux-user/syscall.c index 74378947f0..ebd41fcab4 100644 --- a/linux-user/syscall.c +++ b/linux-user/syscall.c @@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ #define _ATFILE_SOURCE #include "qemu/osdep.h" #include "qemu/cutils.h" -#include "qemu/path.h" #include <elf.h> #include <endian.h> #include <grp.h> @@ -7263,7 +7262,10 @@ static abi_long do_name_to_handle_at(abi_long dirfd, abi_long pathname, fh = g_malloc0(total_size); fh->handle_bytes = size; - ret = get_errno(name_to_handle_at(dirfd, path(name), fh, &mid, flags)); + CHOOSE_INTERP(ret, name, + name_to_handle_at(interp_dirfd, name + 1, fh, &mid, flags), + name_to_handle_at(dirfd, name, fh, &mid, flags)); + ret = get_errno(ret); unlock_user(name, pathname, 0); /* man name_to_handle_at(2): @@ -7639,6 +7641,7 @@ static int do_openat(void *cpu_env, int dirfd, const char *pathname, int flags, #endif { NULL, NULL, NULL } }; + int ret; if (is_proc_myself(pathname, "exe")) { int execfd = qemu_getauxval(AT_EXECFD); @@ -7678,7 +7681,10 @@ static int do_openat(void *cpu_env, int dirfd, const char *pathname, int flags, return fd; } - return safe_openat(dirfd, path(pathname), flags, mode); + CHOOSE_INTERP(ret, pathname, + safe_openat(interp_dirfd, pathname + 1, flags, mode), + safe_openat(dirfd, pathname, flags, mode)); + return ret; } #define TIMER_MAGIC 0x0caf0000 @@ -7831,6 +7837,7 @@ abi_long do_syscall(void *cpu_env, int num, abi_long arg1, struct stat st; struct statfs stfs; void *p; + char *fn; #if defined(DEBUG_ERESTARTSYS) /* Debug-only code for exercising the syscall-restart code paths @@ -8362,10 +8369,14 @@ abi_long do_syscall(void *cpu_env, int num, abi_long arg1, } else { tvp = NULL; } - if (!(p = lock_user_string(arg2))) + if (!(fn = lock_user_string(arg2))) { goto efault; - ret = get_errno(futimesat(arg1, path(p), tvp)); - unlock_user(p, arg2, 0); + } + CHOOSE_INTERP(ret, fn, + futimesat(interp_dirfd, fn + 1, tvp), + futimesat(arg1, fn, tvp)); + ret = get_errno(ret); + unlock_user(fn, arg2, 0); } break; #endif @@ -8379,18 +8390,26 @@ abi_long do_syscall(void *cpu_env, int num, abi_long arg1, #endif #ifdef TARGET_NR_access case TARGET_NR_access: - if (!(p = lock_user_string(arg1))) + if (!(fn = lock_user_string(arg1))) { goto efault; - ret = get_errno(access(path(p), arg2)); - unlock_user(p, arg1, 0); + } + CHOOSE_INTERP(ret, fn, + faccessat(interp_dirfd, fn + 1, arg2, 0), + access(fn, arg2)); + ret = get_errno(ret); + unlock_user(fn, arg1, 0); break; #endif #if defined(TARGET_NR_faccessat) && defined(__NR_faccessat) case TARGET_NR_faccessat: - if (!(p = lock_user_string(arg2))) + if (!(fn = lock_user_string(arg2))) { goto efault; - ret = get_errno(faccessat(arg1, p, arg3, 0)); - unlock_user(p, arg2, 0); + } + CHOOSE_INTERP(ret, fn, + faccessat(interp_dirfd, fn + 1, arg3, 0), + faccessat(arg1, fn, arg3, 0)); + ret = get_errno(ret); + unlock_user(fn, arg2, 0); break; #endif #ifdef TARGET_NR_nice /* not on alpha */ @@ -9307,14 +9326,14 @@ abi_long do_syscall(void *cpu_env, int num, abi_long arg1, case TARGET_NR_readlink: { void *p2; - p = lock_user_string(arg1); + fn = lock_user_string(arg1); p2 = lock_user(VERIFY_WRITE, arg2, arg3, 0); - if (!p || !p2) { + if (!fn || !p2) { ret = -TARGET_EFAULT; } else if (!arg3) { /* Short circuit this for the magic exe check. */ ret = -TARGET_EINVAL; - } else if (is_proc_myself((const char *)p, "exe")) { + } else if (is_proc_myself(fn, "exe")) { char real[PATH_MAX], *temp; temp = realpath(exec_path, real); /* Return value is # of bytes that we wrote to the buffer. */ @@ -9328,10 +9347,13 @@ abi_long do_syscall(void *cpu_env, int num, abi_long arg1, memcpy(p2, real, ret); } } else { - ret = get_errno(readlink(path(p), p2, arg3)); + CHOOSE_INTERP(ret, fn, + readlinkat(interp_dirfd, fn + 1, p2, arg3), + readlink(fn, p2, arg3)); + ret = get_errno(ret); } unlock_user(p2, arg2, ret); - unlock_user(p, arg1, 0); + unlock_user(fn, arg1, 0); } break; #endif @@ -9339,20 +9361,23 @@ abi_long do_syscall(void *cpu_env, int num, abi_long arg1, case TARGET_NR_readlinkat: { void *p2; - p = lock_user_string(arg2); + fn = lock_user_string(arg2); p2 = lock_user(VERIFY_WRITE, arg3, arg4, 0); - if (!p || !p2) { + if (!fn || !p2) { ret = -TARGET_EFAULT; - } else if (is_proc_myself((const char *)p, "exe")) { + } else if (is_proc_myself(fn, "exe")) { char real[PATH_MAX], *temp; temp = realpath(exec_path, real); ret = temp == NULL ? get_errno(-1) : strlen(real) ; snprintf((char *)p2, arg4, "%s", real); } else { - ret = get_errno(readlinkat(arg1, path(p), p2, arg4)); + CHOOSE_INTERP(ret, fn, + readlinkat(interp_dirfd, fn + 1, p2, arg4), + readlinkat(arg1, fn, p2, arg4)); + ret = get_errno(ret); } unlock_user(p2, arg3, ret); - unlock_user(p, arg2, 0); + unlock_user(fn, arg2, 0); } break; #endif @@ -9780,18 +9805,26 @@ abi_long do_syscall(void *cpu_env, int num, abi_long arg1, break; #ifdef TARGET_NR_stat case TARGET_NR_stat: - if (!(p = lock_user_string(arg1))) + if (!(fn = lock_user_string(arg1))) { goto efault; - ret = get_errno(stat(path(p), &st)); - unlock_user(p, arg1, 0); + } + CHOOSE_INTERP(ret, fn, + fstatat(interp_dirfd, fn + 1, &st, 0), + stat(fn, &st)); + ret = get_errno(ret); + unlock_user(fn, arg1, 0); goto do_stat; #endif #ifdef TARGET_NR_lstat case TARGET_NR_lstat: - if (!(p = lock_user_string(arg1))) + if (!(fn = lock_user_string(arg1))) { goto efault; - ret = get_errno(lstat(path(p), &st)); - unlock_user(p, arg1, 0); + } + CHOOSE_INTERP(ret, fn, + fstatat(interp_dirfd, fn + 1, &st, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW), + lstat(fn, &st)); + ret = get_errno(ret); + unlock_user(fn, arg1, 0); goto do_stat; #endif case TARGET_NR_fstat: @@ -10886,20 +10919,28 @@ abi_long do_syscall(void *cpu_env, int num, abi_long arg1, #endif #ifdef TARGET_NR_stat64 case TARGET_NR_stat64: - if (!(p = lock_user_string(arg1))) + if (!(fn = lock_user_string(arg1))) { goto efault; - ret = get_errno(stat(path(p), &st)); - unlock_user(p, arg1, 0); + } + CHOOSE_INTERP(ret, fn, + fstatat(interp_dirfd, fn + 1, &st, 0), + stat(fn, &st)); + ret = get_errno(ret); + unlock_user(fn, arg1, 0); if (!is_error(ret)) ret = host_to_target_stat64(cpu_env, arg2, &st); break; #endif #ifdef TARGET_NR_lstat64 case TARGET_NR_lstat64: - if (!(p = lock_user_string(arg1))) + if (!(fn = lock_user_string(arg1))) { goto efault; - ret = get_errno(lstat(path(p), &st)); - unlock_user(p, arg1, 0); + } + CHOOSE_INTERP(ret, fn, + fstatat(interp_dirfd, fn + 1, &st, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW), + lstat(fn, &st)); + ret = get_errno(ret); + unlock_user(fn, arg1, 0); if (!is_error(ret)) ret = host_to_target_stat64(cpu_env, arg2, &st); break; @@ -10918,9 +10959,14 @@ abi_long do_syscall(void *cpu_env, int num, abi_long arg1, #ifdef TARGET_NR_newfstatat case TARGET_NR_newfstatat: #endif - if (!(p = lock_user_string(arg2))) + if (!(fn = lock_user_string(arg2))) { goto efault; - ret = get_errno(fstatat(arg1, path(p), &st, arg4)); + } + CHOOSE_INTERP(ret, fn, + fstatat(interp_dirfd, fn + 1, &st, arg4), + fstatat(arg1, fn, &st, arg4)); + ret = get_errno(ret); + unlock_user(fn, arg2, 0); if (!is_error(ret)) ret = host_to_target_stat64(cpu_env, arg3, &st); break; @@ -11917,12 +11963,14 @@ abi_long do_syscall(void *cpu_env, int num, abi_long arg1, if (!arg2) ret = get_errno(sys_utimensat(arg1, NULL, tsp, arg4)); else { - if (!(p = lock_user_string(arg2))) { - ret = -TARGET_EFAULT; - goto fail; + if (!(fn = lock_user_string(arg2))) { + goto efault; } - ret = get_errno(sys_utimensat(arg1, path(p), tsp, arg4)); - unlock_user(p, arg2, 0); + CHOOSE_INTERP(ret, fn, + sys_utimensat(interp_dirfd, fn + 1, tsp, arg4), + sys_utimensat(arg1, fn, tsp, arg4)); + ret = get_errno(ret); + unlock_user(fn, arg2, 0); } } break;