Message ID | 20200917094455.822379-1-stefanha@redhat.com |
---|---|
Headers | show |
Series | virtio: restore elem->in/out_sg after iov_discard_front/back() | expand |
On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 10:44:52AM +0100, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote: > v2: > * Add missing undo in virtio-blk write zeroes error path [Li Qiang] > > Both virtio-blk and virtio-crypto use destructive iov_discard_front/back() > operations on elem->in/out_sg. virtqueue_push() calls dma_memory_unmap() on the > modified iovec arrays. The memory addresses may not match those originally > mapped with dma_memory_map(). > > This raises several issues: > 1. MemoryRegion references can be leaked. > 2. Dirty memory may not be tracked. > 3. The non-RAM bounce buffer can be leaked. > > This patch series solves the issue in two ways: > 1. virtio-blk uses a new iov_discard_undo() API to restore iovec arrays. > 2. virtio-crypto uses g_memdup() to avoid modifying the original iovec arrays. > > The g_memdup() approach is slower than iov_discard_undo() but less > complex/fragile. I am less familiar with the virtio-crypto code and it uses > more complex sequences of iov_discard_front/back() calls than virtio-blk. If > anyone feels like optimizing virtio-crypto, please go ahead. > > The virtio-blk bug was found by Alexander Bulekov's fuzzing effort. I found the > virtio-crypto bug through code inspection. > > Stefan Hajnoczi (3): > util/iov: add iov_discard_undo() > virtio-blk: undo destructive iov_discard_*() operations > virtio-crypto: don't modify elem->in/out_sg > > include/hw/virtio/virtio-blk.h | 2 + > include/qemu/iov.h | 23 +++++ > hw/block/virtio-blk.c | 11 ++- > hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c | 17 +++- > tests/test-iov.c | 165 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > util/iov.c | 50 +++++++++- > 6 files changed, 259 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) > > -- > 2.26.2 > Thanks, applied to my block tree: https://github.com/stefanha/qemu/commits/block Stefan