diff mbox series

[net-next,v11,19/23] ovpn: implement key add/get/del/swap via netlink

Message ID 20241029-b4-ovpn-v11-19-de4698c73a25@openvpn.net
State New
Headers show
Series Introducing OpenVPN Data Channel Offload | expand

Commit Message

Antonio Quartulli Oct. 29, 2024, 10:47 a.m. UTC
This change introduces the netlink commands needed to add, get, delete
and swap keys for a specific peer.

Userspace is expected to use these commands to create, inspect (non
sensible data only), destroy and rotate session keys for a specific
peer.

Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <antonio@openvpn.net>
---
 drivers/net/ovpn/crypto.c      |  42 ++++++
 drivers/net/ovpn/crypto.h      |   4 +
 drivers/net/ovpn/crypto_aead.c |  17 +++
 drivers/net/ovpn/crypto_aead.h |   2 +
 drivers/net/ovpn/netlink.c     | 308 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 5 files changed, 369 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

Comments

Sabrina Dubroca Nov. 5, 2024, 10:16 a.m. UTC | #1
2024-10-29, 11:47:32 +0100, Antonio Quartulli wrote:
> This change introduces the netlink commands needed to add, get, delete
> and swap keys for a specific peer.
> 
> Userspace is expected to use these commands to create, inspect (non
> sensible data only), destroy and rotate session keys for a specific

nit: s/sensible/sensitive/

> +int ovpn_crypto_config_get(struct ovpn_crypto_state *cs,
> +			   enum ovpn_key_slot slot,
> +			   struct ovpn_key_config *keyconf)
> +{
[...]
> +
> +	rcu_read_lock();
> +	ks = rcu_dereference(cs->slots[idx]);
> +	if (!ks || (ks && !ovpn_crypto_key_slot_hold(ks))) {
> +		rcu_read_unlock();
> +		return -ENOENT;
> +	}
> +	rcu_read_unlock();

You could stay under rcu_read_lock a little bit longer and avoid
taking a reference just to release it immediately.

> +	keyconf->cipher_alg = ovpn_aead_crypto_alg(ks);
> +	keyconf->key_id = ks->key_id;
> +
> +	ovpn_crypto_key_slot_put(ks);
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}


[...]
>  int ovpn_nl_key_get_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
>  {
[...]
> +	if (NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
> +			      OVPN_A_KEYCONF_PEER_ID))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	peer_id = nla_get_u32(attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_PEER_ID]);
> +
> +	peer = ovpn_peer_get_by_id(ovpn, peer_id);
> +	if (!peer) {
> +		NL_SET_ERR_MSG_FMT_MOD(info->extack,
> +				       "cannot find peer with id %u", 0);

                                                                       peer_id?

> +		return -ENOENT;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
> +			      OVPN_A_KEYCONF_SLOT))
> +		return -EINVAL;

Move this check before ovpn_peer_get_by_id? We're leaking a reference
on the peer.


> +
> +	slot = nla_get_u32(attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_SLOT]);
> +
> +	ret = ovpn_crypto_config_get(&peer->crypto, slot, &keyconf);
> +	if (ret < 0) {
> +		NL_SET_ERR_MSG_FMT_MOD(info->extack,
> +				       "cannot extract key from slot %u for peer %u",
> +				       slot, peer_id);
> +		goto err;
> +	}
> +
> +	msg = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!msg) {
> +		ret = -ENOMEM;
> +		goto err;
> +	}
> +
> +	ret = ovpn_nl_send_key(msg, info, peer->id, slot, &keyconf,
> +			       info->snd_portid, info->snd_seq, 0);

info->snd_portid and info->snd_seq can be extracted from info directly
in ovpn_nl_send_key since there's no other caller, and flags=0 can be
skipped as well.

> +	if (ret < 0) {
> +		nlmsg_free(msg);
> +		goto err;
> +	}
> +
> +	ret = genlmsg_reply(msg, info);
> +err:
> +	ovpn_peer_put(peer);
> +	return ret;
>  }



[...]
>  int ovpn_nl_key_del_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
>  {
> -	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +	struct nlattr *attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_MAX + 1];
> +	struct ovpn_struct *ovpn = info->user_ptr[0];
> +	enum ovpn_key_slot slot;
> +	struct ovpn_peer *peer;
> +	u32 peer_id;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	if (GENL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info, OVPN_A_KEYCONF))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	ret = nla_parse_nested(attrs, OVPN_A_KEYCONF_MAX,
> +			       info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF],
> +			       ovpn_keyconf_nl_policy, info->extack);
> +	if (ret)
> +		return ret;
> +
> +	if (NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
> +			      OVPN_A_KEYCONF_PEER_ID))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	if (ret)
> +		return ret;

leftover?


> +	if (NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
> +			      OVPN_A_KEYCONF_SLOT))
> +		return -EINVAL;
Antonio Quartulli Nov. 12, 2024, 3:40 p.m. UTC | #2
On 05/11/2024 11:16, Sabrina Dubroca wrote:
> 2024-10-29, 11:47:32 +0100, Antonio Quartulli wrote:
>> This change introduces the netlink commands needed to add, get, delete
>> and swap keys for a specific peer.
>>
>> Userspace is expected to use these commands to create, inspect (non
>> sensible data only), destroy and rotate session keys for a specific
> 
> nit: s/sensible/sensitive/
> 
>> +int ovpn_crypto_config_get(struct ovpn_crypto_state *cs,
>> +			   enum ovpn_key_slot slot,
>> +			   struct ovpn_key_config *keyconf)
>> +{
> [...]
>> +
>> +	rcu_read_lock();
>> +	ks = rcu_dereference(cs->slots[idx]);
>> +	if (!ks || (ks && !ovpn_crypto_key_slot_hold(ks))) {
>> +		rcu_read_unlock();
>> +		return -ENOENT;
>> +	}
>> +	rcu_read_unlock();
> 
> You could stay under rcu_read_lock a little bit longer and avoid
> taking a reference just to release it immediately.

ACK.

> 
>> +	keyconf->cipher_alg = ovpn_aead_crypto_alg(ks);
>> +	keyconf->key_id = ks->key_id;
>> +
>> +	ovpn_crypto_key_slot_put(ks);
>> +
>> +	return 0;
>> +}
> 
> 
> [...]
>>   int ovpn_nl_key_get_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
>>   {
> [...]
>> +	if (NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
>> +			      OVPN_A_KEYCONF_PEER_ID))
>> +		return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> +	peer_id = nla_get_u32(attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_PEER_ID]);
>> +
>> +	peer = ovpn_peer_get_by_id(ovpn, peer_id);
>> +	if (!peer) {
>> +		NL_SET_ERR_MSG_FMT_MOD(info->extack,
>> +				       "cannot find peer with id %u", 0);
> 
>                                                                         peer_id?
> 
>> +		return -ENOENT;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	if (NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
>> +			      OVPN_A_KEYCONF_SLOT))
>> +		return -EINVAL;
> 
> Move this check before ovpn_peer_get_by_id? We're leaking a reference
> on the peer.

ACK

> 
> 
>> +
>> +	slot = nla_get_u32(attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_SLOT]);
>> +
>> +	ret = ovpn_crypto_config_get(&peer->crypto, slot, &keyconf);
>> +	if (ret < 0) {
>> +		NL_SET_ERR_MSG_FMT_MOD(info->extack,
>> +				       "cannot extract key from slot %u for peer %u",
>> +				       slot, peer_id);
>> +		goto err;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	msg = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
>> +	if (!msg) {
>> +		ret = -ENOMEM;
>> +		goto err;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	ret = ovpn_nl_send_key(msg, info, peer->id, slot, &keyconf,
>> +			       info->snd_portid, info->snd_seq, 0);
> 
> info->snd_portid and info->snd_seq can be extracted from info directly
> in ovpn_nl_send_key since there's no other caller, and flags=0 can be
> skipped as well.

I tried to keep the signature similar to send_peer, but indeed they can 
both be simplified.

> 
>> +	if (ret < 0) {
>> +		nlmsg_free(msg);
>> +		goto err;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	ret = genlmsg_reply(msg, info);
>> +err:
>> +	ovpn_peer_put(peer);
>> +	return ret;
>>   }
> 
> 
> 
> [...]
>>   int ovpn_nl_key_del_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
>>   {
>> -	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>> +	struct nlattr *attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_MAX + 1];
>> +	struct ovpn_struct *ovpn = info->user_ptr[0];
>> +	enum ovpn_key_slot slot;
>> +	struct ovpn_peer *peer;
>> +	u32 peer_id;
>> +	int ret;
>> +
>> +	if (GENL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info, OVPN_A_KEYCONF))
>> +		return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> +	ret = nla_parse_nested(attrs, OVPN_A_KEYCONF_MAX,
>> +			       info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF],
>> +			       ovpn_keyconf_nl_policy, info->extack);
>> +	if (ret)
>> +		return ret;
>> +
>> +	if (NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
>> +			      OVPN_A_KEYCONF_PEER_ID))
>> +		return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> +	if (ret)
>> +		return ret;
> 
> leftover?

very likely.

Thanks a lot

Regards,

> 
> 
>> +	if (NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
>> +			      OVPN_A_KEYCONF_SLOT))
>> +		return -EINVAL;
>
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/drivers/net/ovpn/crypto.c b/drivers/net/ovpn/crypto.c
index f1f7510e2f735e367f96eb4982ba82c9af3c8bfc..cfb014c947b968752ba3dab84ec42dc8ec086379 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ovpn/crypto.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ovpn/crypto.c
@@ -151,3 +151,45 @@  void ovpn_crypto_key_slots_swap(struct ovpn_crypto_state *cs)
 
 	spin_unlock_bh(&cs->lock);
 }
+
+/**
+ * ovpn_crypto_config_get - populate keyconf object with non-sensible key data
+ * @cs: the crypto state to extract the key data from
+ * @slot: the specific slot to inspect
+ * @keyconf: the output object to populate
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success or a negative error code otherwise
+ */
+int ovpn_crypto_config_get(struct ovpn_crypto_state *cs,
+			   enum ovpn_key_slot slot,
+			   struct ovpn_key_config *keyconf)
+{
+	struct ovpn_crypto_key_slot *ks;
+	int idx;
+
+	switch (slot) {
+	case OVPN_KEY_SLOT_PRIMARY:
+		idx = cs->primary_idx;
+		break;
+	case OVPN_KEY_SLOT_SECONDARY:
+		idx = !cs->primary_idx;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	ks = rcu_dereference(cs->slots[idx]);
+	if (!ks || (ks && !ovpn_crypto_key_slot_hold(ks))) {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	keyconf->cipher_alg = ovpn_aead_crypto_alg(ks);
+	keyconf->key_id = ks->key_id;
+
+	ovpn_crypto_key_slot_put(ks);
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/drivers/net/ovpn/crypto.h b/drivers/net/ovpn/crypto.h
index 3b437d26b531c3034cca5343c755ef9c7ef57276..96fd41f4b81b74f8a3ecfe33ee24ba0122d222fe 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ovpn/crypto.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ovpn/crypto.h
@@ -136,4 +136,8 @@  void ovpn_crypto_state_release(struct ovpn_crypto_state *cs);
 
 void ovpn_crypto_key_slots_swap(struct ovpn_crypto_state *cs);
 
+int ovpn_crypto_config_get(struct ovpn_crypto_state *cs,
+			   enum ovpn_key_slot slot,
+			   struct ovpn_key_config *keyconf);
+
 #endif /* _NET_OVPN_OVPNCRYPTO_H_ */
diff --git a/drivers/net/ovpn/crypto_aead.c b/drivers/net/ovpn/crypto_aead.c
index 072bb0881764752520e8e26e18337c1274ce1aa4..25e4e4a453b2bc499aec9a192fe3d86ba1aac511 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ovpn/crypto_aead.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ovpn/crypto_aead.c
@@ -367,3 +367,20 @@  ovpn_aead_crypto_key_slot_new(const struct ovpn_key_config *kc)
 	ovpn_aead_crypto_key_slot_destroy(ks);
 	return ERR_PTR(ret);
 }
+
+enum ovpn_cipher_alg ovpn_aead_crypto_alg(struct ovpn_crypto_key_slot *ks)
+{
+	const char *alg_name;
+
+	if (!ks->encrypt)
+		return OVPN_CIPHER_ALG_NONE;
+
+	alg_name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_aead_tfm(ks->encrypt));
+
+	if (!strcmp(alg_name, ALG_NAME_AES))
+		return OVPN_CIPHER_ALG_AES_GCM;
+	else if (!strcmp(alg_name, ALG_NAME_CHACHAPOLY))
+		return OVPN_CIPHER_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305;
+	else
+		return OVPN_CIPHER_ALG_NONE;
+}
diff --git a/drivers/net/ovpn/crypto_aead.h b/drivers/net/ovpn/crypto_aead.h
index 77ee8141599bc06b0dc664c5b0a4dae660a89238..fb65be82436edd7ff89b171f7a89c9103b617d1f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ovpn/crypto_aead.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ovpn/crypto_aead.h
@@ -28,4 +28,6 @@  struct ovpn_crypto_key_slot *
 ovpn_aead_crypto_key_slot_new(const struct ovpn_key_config *kc);
 void ovpn_aead_crypto_key_slot_destroy(struct ovpn_crypto_key_slot *ks);
 
+enum ovpn_cipher_alg ovpn_aead_crypto_alg(struct ovpn_crypto_key_slot *ks);
+
 #endif /* _NET_OVPN_OVPNAEAD_H_ */
diff --git a/drivers/net/ovpn/netlink.c b/drivers/net/ovpn/netlink.c
index d504445325ef82db04f87367c858adaf025f6297..fe9377b9b8145784917460cd5f222bc7fae4d8db 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ovpn/netlink.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ovpn/netlink.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ 
 #include "netlink.h"
 #include "netlink-gen.h"
 #include "bind.h"
+#include "crypto.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "peer.h"
 #include "socket.h"
@@ -679,24 +680,323 @@  int ovpn_nl_peer_del_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int ovpn_nl_get_key_dir(struct genl_info *info, struct nlattr *key,
+			       enum ovpn_cipher_alg cipher,
+			       struct ovpn_key_direction *dir)
+{
+	struct nlattr *attrs[OVPN_A_KEYDIR_MAX + 1];
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = nla_parse_nested(attrs, OVPN_A_KEYDIR_MAX, key,
+			       ovpn_keydir_nl_policy, info->extack);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	switch (cipher) {
+	case OVPN_CIPHER_ALG_AES_GCM:
+	case OVPN_CIPHER_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
+		if (NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, key, attrs,
+				      OVPN_A_KEYDIR_CIPHER_KEY) ||
+		    NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, key, attrs,
+				      OVPN_A_KEYDIR_NONCE_TAIL))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		dir->cipher_key = nla_data(attrs[OVPN_A_KEYDIR_CIPHER_KEY]);
+		dir->cipher_key_size = nla_len(attrs[OVPN_A_KEYDIR_CIPHER_KEY]);
+
+		/* These algorithms require a 96bit nonce,
+		 * Construct it by combining 4-bytes packet id and
+		 * 8-bytes nonce-tail from userspace
+		 */
+		dir->nonce_tail = nla_data(attrs[OVPN_A_KEYDIR_NONCE_TAIL]);
+		dir->nonce_tail_size = nla_len(attrs[OVPN_A_KEYDIR_NONCE_TAIL]);
+		break;
+	default:
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(info->extack, "unsupported cipher");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ovpn_nl_key_new_doit - configure a new key for the specified peer
+ * @skb: incoming netlink message
+ * @info: genetlink metadata
+ *
+ * This function allows the user to install a new key in the peer crypto
+ * state.
+ * Each peer has two 'slots', namely 'primary' and 'secondary', where
+ * keys can be installed. The key in the 'primary' slot is used for
+ * encryption, while both keys can be used for decryption by matching the
+ * key ID carried in the incoming packet.
+ *
+ * The user is responsible for rotating keys when necessary. The user
+ * may fetch peer traffic statistics via netlink in order to better
+ * identify the right time to rotate keys.
+ * The renegotiation follows these steps:
+ * 1. a new key is computed by the user and is installed in the 'secondary'
+ *    slot
+ * 2. at user discretion (usually after a predetermined time) 'primary' and
+ *    'secondary' contents are swapped and the new key starts being used for
+ *    encryption, while the old key is kept around for decryption of late
+ *    packets.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success or a negative error code otherwise.
+ */
 int ovpn_nl_key_new_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 {
-	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	struct nlattr *attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_MAX + 1];
+	struct ovpn_struct *ovpn = info->user_ptr[0];
+	struct ovpn_peer_key_reset pkr;
+	struct ovpn_peer *peer;
+	u32 peer_id;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (GENL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info, OVPN_A_KEYCONF))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret = nla_parse_nested(attrs, OVPN_A_KEYCONF_MAX,
+			       info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF],
+			       ovpn_keyconf_nl_policy, info->extack);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
+			      OVPN_A_KEYCONF_PEER_ID))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
+			      OVPN_A_KEYCONF_SLOT) ||
+	    NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
+			      OVPN_A_KEYCONF_KEY_ID) ||
+	    NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
+			      OVPN_A_KEYCONF_CIPHER_ALG) ||
+	    NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
+			      OVPN_A_KEYCONF_ENCRYPT_DIR) ||
+	    NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
+			      OVPN_A_KEYCONF_DECRYPT_DIR))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	peer_id = nla_get_u32(attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_PEER_ID]);
+	pkr.slot = nla_get_u8(attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_SLOT]);
+	pkr.key.key_id = nla_get_u16(attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_KEY_ID]);
+	pkr.key.cipher_alg = nla_get_u16(attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_CIPHER_ALG]);
+
+	ret = ovpn_nl_get_key_dir(info, attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_ENCRYPT_DIR],
+				  pkr.key.cipher_alg, &pkr.key.encrypt);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = ovpn_nl_get_key_dir(info, attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_DECRYPT_DIR],
+				  pkr.key.cipher_alg, &pkr.key.decrypt);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	peer = ovpn_peer_get_by_id(ovpn, peer_id);
+	if (!peer) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG_FMT_MOD(info->extack,
+				       "no peer with id %u to set key for",
+				       peer_id);
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	ret = ovpn_crypto_state_reset(&peer->crypto, &pkr);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG_FMT_MOD(info->extack,
+				       "cannot install new key for peer %u",
+				       peer_id);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	netdev_dbg(ovpn->dev, "%s: new key installed (id=%u) for peer %u\n",
+		   __func__, pkr.key.key_id, peer_id);
+out:
+	ovpn_peer_put(peer);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int ovpn_nl_send_key(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct genl_info *info,
+			    u32 peer_id, enum ovpn_key_slot slot,
+			    const struct ovpn_key_config *keyconf, u32 portid,
+			    u32 seq, int flags)
+{
+	struct nlattr *attr;
+	void *hdr;
+
+	hdr = genlmsg_put(skb, portid, seq, &ovpn_nl_family, flags,
+			  OVPN_CMD_KEY_GET);
+	if (!hdr)
+		return -ENOBUFS;
+
+	attr = nla_nest_start(skb, OVPN_A_KEYCONF);
+	if (!attr)
+		goto err;
+
+	if (nla_put_u32(skb, OVPN_A_KEYCONF_PEER_ID, peer_id))
+		goto err;
+
+	if (nla_put_u32(skb, OVPN_A_KEYCONF_SLOT, slot) ||
+	    nla_put_u32(skb, OVPN_A_KEYCONF_KEY_ID, keyconf->key_id) ||
+	    nla_put_u32(skb, OVPN_A_KEYCONF_CIPHER_ALG, keyconf->cipher_alg))
+		goto err;
+
+	nla_nest_end(skb, attr);
+	genlmsg_end(skb, hdr);
+
+	return 0;
+err:
+	genlmsg_cancel(skb, hdr);
+	return -EMSGSIZE;
 }
 
 int ovpn_nl_key_get_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 {
-	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	struct nlattr *attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_MAX + 1];
+	struct ovpn_struct *ovpn = info->user_ptr[0];
+	struct ovpn_key_config keyconf = { 0 };
+	enum ovpn_key_slot slot;
+	struct ovpn_peer *peer;
+	struct sk_buff *msg;
+	u32 peer_id;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (GENL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info, OVPN_A_KEYCONF))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret = nla_parse_nested(attrs, OVPN_A_KEYCONF_MAX,
+			       info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF],
+			       ovpn_keyconf_nl_policy, info->extack);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
+			      OVPN_A_KEYCONF_PEER_ID))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	peer_id = nla_get_u32(attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_PEER_ID]);
+
+	peer = ovpn_peer_get_by_id(ovpn, peer_id);
+	if (!peer) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG_FMT_MOD(info->extack,
+				       "cannot find peer with id %u", 0);
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	if (NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
+			      OVPN_A_KEYCONF_SLOT))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	slot = nla_get_u32(attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_SLOT]);
+
+	ret = ovpn_crypto_config_get(&peer->crypto, slot, &keyconf);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG_FMT_MOD(info->extack,
+				       "cannot extract key from slot %u for peer %u",
+				       slot, peer_id);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	msg = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!msg) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	ret = ovpn_nl_send_key(msg, info, peer->id, slot, &keyconf,
+			       info->snd_portid, info->snd_seq, 0);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		nlmsg_free(msg);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	ret = genlmsg_reply(msg, info);
+err:
+	ovpn_peer_put(peer);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 int ovpn_nl_key_swap_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 {
-	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	struct ovpn_struct *ovpn = info->user_ptr[0];
+	struct nlattr *attrs[OVPN_A_PEER_MAX + 1];
+	struct ovpn_peer *peer;
+	u32 peer_id;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (GENL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info, OVPN_A_KEYCONF))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret = nla_parse_nested(attrs, OVPN_A_KEYCONF_MAX,
+			       info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF],
+			       ovpn_keyconf_nl_policy, info->extack);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
+			      OVPN_A_KEYCONF_PEER_ID))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	peer_id = nla_get_u32(attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_PEER_ID]);
+
+	peer = ovpn_peer_get_by_id(ovpn, peer_id);
+	if (!peer) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG_FMT_MOD(info->extack,
+				       "no peer with id %u to swap keys for",
+				       peer_id);
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	ovpn_crypto_key_slots_swap(&peer->crypto);
+	ovpn_peer_put(peer);
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 int ovpn_nl_key_del_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 {
-	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	struct nlattr *attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_MAX + 1];
+	struct ovpn_struct *ovpn = info->user_ptr[0];
+	enum ovpn_key_slot slot;
+	struct ovpn_peer *peer;
+	u32 peer_id;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (GENL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info, OVPN_A_KEYCONF))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret = nla_parse_nested(attrs, OVPN_A_KEYCONF_MAX,
+			       info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF],
+			       ovpn_keyconf_nl_policy, info->extack);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
+			      OVPN_A_KEYCONF_PEER_ID))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (NL_REQ_ATTR_CHECK(info->extack, info->attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF], attrs,
+			      OVPN_A_KEYCONF_SLOT))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	peer_id = nla_get_u32(attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_PEER_ID]);
+	slot = nla_get_u8(attrs[OVPN_A_KEYCONF_SLOT]);
+
+	peer = ovpn_peer_get_by_id(ovpn, peer_id);
+	if (!peer) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG_FMT_MOD(info->extack,
+				       "no peer with id %u to delete key for",
+				       peer_id);
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	ovpn_crypto_key_slot_delete(&peer->crypto, slot);
+	ovpn_peer_put(peer);
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /**