diff mbox series

[5.12,030/296] proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener

Message ID 20210531130704.809305391@linuxfoundation.org
State New
Headers show
Series None | expand

Commit Message

gregkh@linuxfoundation.org May 31, 2021, 1:11 p.m. UTC 
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

commit bfb819ea20ce8bbeeba17e1a6418bf8bda91fc28 upstream.

Fix another "confused deputy" weakness[1]. Writes to /proc/$pid/attr/
files need to check the opener credentials, since these fds do not
transition state across execve(). Without this, it is possible to
trick another process (which may have different credentials) to write
to its own /proc/$pid/attr/ files, leading to unexpected and possibly
exploitable behaviors.

[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/security/credentials.html?highlight=confused#open-file-credentials

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f41 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/proc/base.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff mbox series

Patch

--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2703,6 +2703,10 @@  static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struc
 	void *page;
 	int rv;
 
+	/* A task may only write when it was the opener. */
+	if (file->f_cred != current_real_cred())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID);
 	if (!task) {