diff mbox series

[bpf] skmsg: check sk_rcvbuf limit before queuing to ingress_skb

Message ID 20210629062029.13684-1-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com
State Superseded
Headers show
Series [bpf] skmsg: check sk_rcvbuf limit before queuing to ingress_skb | expand

Commit Message

Cong Wang June 29, 2021, 6:20 a.m. UTC 
From: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>

Jiang observed OOM frequently when testing our AF_UNIX/UDP
proxy. This is due to the fact that we do not actually limit
the socket memory before queueing skb to ingress_skb. We
charge the skb memory later when handling the psock backlog,
but it is not limited either.

This patch adds checks for sk->sk_rcvbuf right before queuing
to ingress_skb and drops packets if this limit exceeds. This
is very similar to UDP receive path. Ideally we should set the
skb owner before this check too, but it is hard to make TCP
happy about sk_forward_alloc.

Reported-by: Jiang Wang <jiang.wang@bytedance.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Cc: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
---
 net/core/skmsg.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Comments

Jakub Sitnicki June 30, 2021, 9:21 a.m. UTC | #1 
On Tue, Jun 29, 2021 at 08:20 AM CEST, Cong Wang wrote:

[...]

> @@ -854,7 +854,8 @@ static int sk_psock_skb_redirect(struct sk_psock *from, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  		return -EIO;
>  	}
>  	spin_lock_bh(&psock_other->ingress_lock);
> -	if (!sk_psock_test_state(psock_other, SK_PSOCK_TX_ENABLED)) {
> +	if (!sk_psock_test_state(psock_other, SK_PSOCK_TX_ENABLED) ||
> +	    atomic_read(&sk_other->sk_rmem_alloc) > sk_other->sk_rcvbuf) {
>  		spin_unlock_bh(&psock_other->ingress_lock);
>  		skb_bpf_redirect_clear(skb);
>  		sock_drop(from->sk, skb);
> @@ -930,7 +931,8 @@ static int sk_psock_verdict_apply(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb,
>  		}
>  		if (err < 0) {
>  			spin_lock_bh(&psock->ingress_lock);
> -			if (sk_psock_test_state(psock, SK_PSOCK_TX_ENABLED)) {
> +			if (sk_psock_test_state(psock, SK_PSOCK_TX_ENABLED) &&
> +			    atomic_read(&sk_other->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk_other->sk_rcvbuf) {
>  				skb_queue_tail(&psock->ingress_skb, skb);
>  				schedule_work(&psock->work);
>  				err = 0;

I belive access to sk_rcvbuf should be annotated with READ_ONCE (for
KCSAN's sake) as we don't lock the egress socket. See 8265792bf887 [1]
("net: silence KCSAN warnings around sk_add_backlog() calls") for
guidance.

[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=8265792bf8871acc2d00fd03883d830e2249d395
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/net/core/skmsg.c b/net/core/skmsg.c
index 9b6160a191f8..83b581d8023d 100644
--- a/net/core/skmsg.c
+++ b/net/core/skmsg.c
@@ -854,7 +854,8 @@  static int sk_psock_skb_redirect(struct sk_psock *from, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 	spin_lock_bh(&psock_other->ingress_lock);
-	if (!sk_psock_test_state(psock_other, SK_PSOCK_TX_ENABLED)) {
+	if (!sk_psock_test_state(psock_other, SK_PSOCK_TX_ENABLED) ||
+	    atomic_read(&sk_other->sk_rmem_alloc) > sk_other->sk_rcvbuf) {
 		spin_unlock_bh(&psock_other->ingress_lock);
 		skb_bpf_redirect_clear(skb);
 		sock_drop(from->sk, skb);
@@ -930,7 +931,8 @@  static int sk_psock_verdict_apply(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		}
 		if (err < 0) {
 			spin_lock_bh(&psock->ingress_lock);
-			if (sk_psock_test_state(psock, SK_PSOCK_TX_ENABLED)) {
+			if (sk_psock_test_state(psock, SK_PSOCK_TX_ENABLED) &&
+			    atomic_read(&sk_other->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk_other->sk_rcvbuf) {
 				skb_queue_tail(&psock->ingress_skb, skb);
 				schedule_work(&psock->work);
 				err = 0;