From patchwork Fri May 26 14:31:02 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Howells X-Patchwork-Id: 686148 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E59CCC7EE23 for ; Fri, 26 May 2023 14:32:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S243958AbjEZOc4 (ORCPT ); Fri, 26 May 2023 10:32:56 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55250 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230263AbjEZOcW (ORCPT ); Fri, 26 May 2023 10:32:22 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com [170.10.133.124]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A32DF1A2 for ; Fri, 26 May 2023 07:31:32 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1685111491; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=j6NjOw4LTe31mdhiQO2H52w9dxcv2LHBSUfpmtyBwDw=; b=DKub7SmabLoxssh5nBezdd2D2AwFP60FlTUqkqr+0FdwjAkMmboaK/XHVjkLW8EnjCklDK DqTo3dGd3aFYSuNjjLkatMshRo1dLFaEwGEfhah/wblhdHAWjnl3ruOjkNVjQzTd5CA4ir /zrL5/X+dz/IrudrcAPBWbxMG6y72Dw= Received: from mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (mimecast-mx02.redhat.com [66.187.233.88]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-540-giAiFR8VOP2yBdrrkgccjg-1; Fri, 26 May 2023 10:31:28 -0400 X-MC-Unique: giAiFR8VOP2yBdrrkgccjg-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx01.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.54.1]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B9D41800B2A; Fri, 26 May 2023 14:31:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: from warthog.procyon.org.uk (unknown [10.39.192.68]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D3B91407DEC3; Fri, 26 May 2023 14:31:25 +0000 (UTC) From: David Howells To: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: David Howells , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Eric Dumazet , Jakub Kicinski , Paolo Abeni , Willem de Bruijn , David Ahern , Matthew Wilcox , Jens Axboe , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH net-next 6/8] crypto: af_alg: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES Date: Fri, 26 May 2023 15:31:02 +0100 Message-Id: <20230526143104.882842-7-dhowells@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <20230526143104.882842-1-dhowells@redhat.com> References: <20230526143104.882842-1-dhowells@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.1 on 10.11.54.1 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Make AF_ALG sendmsg() support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES. This causes pages to be spliced from the source iterator. This allows ->sendpage() to be replaced by something that can handle multiple multipage folios in a single transaction. Signed-off-by: David Howells cc: Herbert Xu cc: "David S. Miller" cc: Eric Dumazet cc: Jakub Kicinski cc: Paolo Abeni cc: Jens Axboe cc: Matthew Wilcox cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org --- crypto/af_alg.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- crypto/algif_aead.c | 22 +++++++++++----------- crypto/algif_skcipher.c | 8 ++++---- 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/af_alg.c b/crypto/af_alg.c index 17ecaae50af7..979033600185 100644 --- a/crypto/af_alg.c +++ b/crypto/af_alg.c @@ -940,6 +940,10 @@ int af_alg_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, bool init = false; int err = 0; + if ((msg->msg_flags & MSG_SPLICE_PAGES) && + !iov_iter_is_bvec(&msg->msg_iter)) + return -EINVAL; + if (msg->msg_controllen) { err = af_alg_cmsg_send(msg, &con); if (err) @@ -985,7 +989,7 @@ int af_alg_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, while (size) { struct scatterlist *sg; size_t len = size; - size_t plen; + ssize_t plen; /* use the existing memory in an allocated page */ if (ctx->merge) { @@ -1030,7 +1034,27 @@ int af_alg_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, if (sgl->cur) sg_unmark_end(sg + sgl->cur - 1); - if (1 /* TODO check MSG_SPLICE_PAGES */) { + if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_SPLICE_PAGES) { + struct sg_table sgtable = { + .sgl = sg, + .nents = sgl->cur, + .orig_nents = sgl->cur, + }; + + plen = extract_iter_to_sg(&msg->msg_iter, len, &sgtable, + MAX_SGL_ENTS, 0); + if (plen < 0) { + err = plen; + goto unlock; + } + + for (; sgl->cur < sgtable.nents; sgl->cur++) + get_page(sg_page(&sg[sgl->cur])); + len -= plen; + ctx->used += plen; + copied += plen; + size -= plen; + } else { do { struct page *pg; unsigned int i = sgl->cur; diff --git a/crypto/algif_aead.c b/crypto/algif_aead.c index f6aa3856d8d5..b16111a3025a 100644 --- a/crypto/algif_aead.c +++ b/crypto/algif_aead.c @@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ * The following concept of the memory management is used: * * The kernel maintains two SGLs, the TX SGL and the RX SGL. The TX SGL is - * filled by user space with the data submitted via sendpage/sendmsg. Filling - * up the TX SGL does not cause a crypto operation -- the data will only be + * filled by user space with the data submitted via sendpage. Filling up + * the TX SGL does not cause a crypto operation -- the data will only be * tracked by the kernel. Upon receipt of one recvmsg call, the caller must * provide a buffer which is tracked with the RX SGL. * @@ -113,19 +113,19 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, } /* - * Data length provided by caller via sendmsg/sendpage that has not - * yet been processed. + * Data length provided by caller via sendmsg that has not yet been + * processed. */ used = ctx->used; /* - * Make sure sufficient data is present -- note, the same check is - * also present in sendmsg/sendpage. The checks in sendpage/sendmsg - * shall provide an information to the data sender that something is - * wrong, but they are irrelevant to maintain the kernel integrity. - * We need this check here too in case user space decides to not honor - * the error message in sendmsg/sendpage and still call recvmsg. This - * check here protects the kernel integrity. + * Make sure sufficient data is present -- note, the same check is also + * present in sendmsg. The checks in sendmsg shall provide an + * information to the data sender that something is wrong, but they are + * irrelevant to maintain the kernel integrity. We need this check + * here too in case user space decides to not honor the error message + * in sendmsg and still call recvmsg. This check here protects the + * kernel integrity. */ if (!aead_sufficient_data(sk)) return -EINVAL; diff --git a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c index a251cd6bd5b9..b1f321b9f846 100644 --- a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c +++ b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c @@ -9,10 +9,10 @@ * The following concept of the memory management is used: * * The kernel maintains two SGLs, the TX SGL and the RX SGL. The TX SGL is - * filled by user space with the data submitted via sendpage/sendmsg. Filling - * up the TX SGL does not cause a crypto operation -- the data will only be - * tracked by the kernel. Upon receipt of one recvmsg call, the caller must - * provide a buffer which is tracked with the RX SGL. + * filled by user space with the data submitted via sendmsg. Filling up the TX + * SGL does not cause a crypto operation -- the data will only be tracked by + * the kernel. Upon receipt of one recvmsg call, the caller must provide a + * buffer which is tracked with the RX SGL. * * During the processing of the recvmsg operation, the cipher request is * allocated and prepared. As part of the recvmsg operation, the processed