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Wed, 24 Jan 2024 22:30:35 -0800 (PST) From: debug@rivosinc.com To: rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, broonie@kernel.org, Szabolcs.Nagy@arm.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, keescook@chromium.org, ajones@ventanamicro.com, paul.walmsley@sifive.com, palmer@dabbelt.com, conor.dooley@microchip.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, atishp@atishpatra.org, alex@ghiti.fr, bjorn@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com Cc: corbet@lwn.net, aou@eecs.berkeley.edu, oleg@redhat.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org, arnd@arndb.de, ebiederm@xmission.com, shuah@kernel.org, brauner@kernel.org, debug@rivosinc.com, guoren@kernel.org, samitolvanen@google.com, evan@rivosinc.com, xiao.w.wang@intel.com, apatel@ventanamicro.com, mchitale@ventanamicro.com, waylingii@gmail.com, greentime.hu@sifive.com, heiko@sntech.de, jszhang@kernel.org, shikemeng@huaweicloud.com, david@redhat.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, panqinglin2020@iscas.ac.cn, willy@infradead.org, vincent.chen@sifive.com, andy.chiu@sifive.com, gerg@kernel.org, jeeheng.sia@starfivetech.com, mason.huo@starfivetech.com, ancientmodern4@gmail.com, mathis.salmen@matsal.de, cuiyunhui@bytedance.com, bhe@redhat.com, chenjiahao16@huawei.com, ruscur@russell.cc, bgray@linux.ibm.com, alx@kernel.org, baruch@tkos.co.il, zhangqing@loongson.cn, catalin.marinas@arm.com, revest@chromium.org, josh@joshtriplett.org, joey.gouly@arm.com, shr@devkernel.io, omosnace@redhat.com, ojeda@kernel.org, jhubbard@nvidia.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 27/28] riscv: Documentation for shadow stack on riscv Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 22:21:52 -0800 Message-ID: <20240125062739.1339782-28-debug@rivosinc.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.43.0 In-Reply-To: <20240125062739.1339782-1-debug@rivosinc.com> References: <20240125062739.1339782-1-debug@rivosinc.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Deepak Gupta Adding documentation on shadow stack for user mode on riscv and kernel interfaces exposed so that user tasks can enable it. Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst | 169 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 169 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst diff --git a/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst b/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f133b6af9c15 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +:Author: Deepak Gupta +:Date: 12 January 2024 + +========================================================= +Shadow stack to protect function returns on RISC-V Linux +========================================================= + +This document briefly describes the interface provided to userspace by Linux +to enable shadow stack for user mode applications on RISV-V + +1. Feature Overview +-------------------- + +Memory corruption issues usually result in to crashes, however when in hands of +an adversary and if used creatively can result into variety security issues. + +One of those security issues can be code re-use attacks on program where adversary +can use corrupt return addresses present on stack and chain them together to perform +return oriented programming (ROP) and thus compromising control flow integrity (CFI) +of the program. + +Return addresses live on stack and thus in read-write memory and thus are +susceptible to corruption and allows an adversary to reach any program counter +(PC) in address space. On RISC-V `zicfiss` extension provides an alternate stack +`shadow stack` on which return addresses can be safely placed in prolog of the +function and retrieved in epilog. `zicfiss` extension makes following changes + + - PTE encodings for shadow stack virtual memory + An earlier reserved encoding in first stage translation i.e. + PTE.R=0, PTE.W=1, PTE.X=0 becomes PTE encoding for shadow stack pages. + + - `sspush x1/x5` instruction pushes (stores) `x1/x5` to shadow stack. + + - `sspopchk x1/x5` instruction pops (loads) from shadow stack and compares + with `x1/x5` and if un-equal, CPU raises `software check exception` with + `*tval = 3` + +Compiler toolchain makes sure that function prologs have `sspush x1/x5` to save return +address on shadow stack in addition to regular stack. Similarly function epilogs have +`ld x5, offset(x2)`; `sspopchk x5` to ensure that popped value from regular stack +matches with popped value from shadow stack. + +2. Shadow stack protections and linux memory manager +----------------------------------------------------- + +As mentioned earlier, shadow stack get new page table encodings and thus have some +special properties assigned to them and instructions that operate on them as below + + - Regular stores to shadow stack memory raises access store faults. + This way shadow stack memory is protected from stray inadvertant + writes + + - Regular loads to shadow stack memory are allowed. + This allows stack trace utilities or backtrace functions to read + true callstack (not tampered) + + - Only shadow stack instructions can generate shadow stack load or + shadow stack store. + + - Shadow stack load / shadow stack store on read-only memory raises + AMO/store page fault. Thus both `sspush x1/x5` and `sspopchk x1/x5` + will raise AMO/store page fault. This simplies COW handling in kernel + During fork, kernel can convert shadow stack pages into read-only + memory (as it does for regular read-write memory) and as soon as + subsequent `sspush` or `sspopchk` in userspace is encountered, then + kernel can perform COW. + + - Shadow stack load / shadow stack store on read-write, read-write- + execute memory raises an access fault. This is a fatal condition + because shadow stack should never be operating on read-write, read- + write-execute memory. + +3. ELF and psABI +----------------- + +Toolchain sets up `GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_BCFI` for property +`GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_AND` in notes section of the object file. + +4. Linux enabling +------------------ + +User space programs can have multiple shared objects loaded in its address space +and it's a difficult task to make sure all the dependencies have been compiled +with support of shadow stack. Thus it's left to dynamic loader to enable +shadow stack for the program. + +5. prctl() enabling +-------------------- + +`PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS` / `PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS` / +`PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS` are three prctls added to manage shadow stack +enabling for tasks. prctls are arch agnostic and returns -EINVAL on other arches. + +`PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS`: If arg1 `PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE` and if CPU supports +`zicfiss` then kernel will enable shadow stack for the task. Dynamic loader can +issue this `prctl` once it has determined that all the objects loaded in address +space have support for shadow stack. Additionally if there is a `dlopen` to an +object which wasn't compiled with `zicfiss`, dynamic loader can issue this prctl +with arg1 set to 0 (i.e. `PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE` being clear) + +`PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS`: Returns current status of indirect branch tracking. +If enabled it'll return `PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE` + +`PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS`: Locks current status of shadow stack enabling on the +task. User space may want to run with strict security posture and wouldn't want +loading of objects without `zicfiss` support in it and thus would want to disallow +disabling of shadow stack on current task. In that case user space can use this prctl +to lock current settings. + +5. violations related to returns with shadow stack enabled +----------------------------------------------------------- + +Pertaining to shadow stack, CPU raises software check exception in following +condition + + - On execution of `sspopchk x1/x5`, x1/x5 didn't match top of shadow stack. + If mismatch happens then cpu does `*tval = 3` and raise software check + exception + +Linux kernel will treat this as `SIGSEV`` with code = `SEGV_CPERR` and follow +normal course of signal delivery. + +6. Shadow stack tokens +----------------------- +Regular stores on shadow stacks are not allowed and thus can't be tampered with via +arbitrary stray writes due to bugs. Method of pivoting / switching to shadow stack +is simply writing to csr `CSR_SSP` changes active shadow stack. This can be problematic +because usually value to be written to `CSR_SSP` will be loaded somewhere in writeable +memory and thus allows an adversary to corruption bug in software to pivot to an any +address in shadow stack range. Shadow stack tokens can help mitigate this problem by +making sure that: + + - When software is switching away from a shadow stack, shadow stack pointer should be + saved on shadow stack itself and call it `shadow stack token` + + - When software is switching to a shadow stack, it should read the `shadow stack token` + from shadow stack pointer and verify that `shadow stack token` itself is pointer to + shadow stack itself. + + - Once the token verification is done, software can perform the write to `CSR_SSP` to + switch shadow stack. + +Here software can be user mode task runtime itself which is managing various contexts +as part of single thread. Software can be kernel as well when kernel has to deliver a +signal to user task and must save shadow stack pointer. Kernel can perform similar +procedure by saving a token on user shadow stack itself. This way whenever sigreturn +happens, kernel can read the token and verify the token and then switch to shadow stack. +Using this mechanism, kernel helps user task so that any corruption issue in user task +is not exploited by adversary by arbitrarily using `sigreturn`. Adversary will have to +make sure that there is a `shadow stack token` in addition to invoking `sigreturn` + +7. Signal shadow stack +----------------------- +Following structure has been added to sigcontext for RISC-V. `rsvd` field has been kept +in case we need some extra information in future for landing pads / indirect branch +tracking. It has been kept today in order to allow backward compatibility in future. + +struct __sc_riscv_cfi_state { + unsigned long ss_ptr; + unsigned long rsvd; +}; + +As part of signal delivery, shadow stack token is saved on current shadow stack itself and +updated pointer is saved away in `ss_ptr` field in `__sc_riscv_cfi_state` under `sigcontext` +Existing shadow stack allocation is used for signal delivery. During `sigreturn`, kernel will +obtain `ss_ptr` from `sigcontext` and verify the saved token on shadow stack itself and switch +shadow stack.