From patchwork Wed Jan 9 23:55:37 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jeremy Linton X-Patchwork-Id: 155095 Delivered-To: patch@linaro.org Received: by 2002:a02:48:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id 69csp1277363jaa; Wed, 9 Jan 2019 15:55:50 -0800 (PST) X-Google-Smtp-Source: ALg8bN5VoxIwJ+lSXixB0cdY2E3/tGnxpCG/340I5c+m2EH2Txow46D/Xj5SOzCSpoJ/Jnbqr3uu X-Received: by 2002:a63:e74b:: with SMTP id j11mr594354pgk.397.1547078150834; Wed, 09 Jan 2019 15:55:50 -0800 (PST) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1547078150; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=z4i7tr48bQnhdMvlzgjTd+hH3X8Rz7w2+nOy1Nqxt3Qpjt9IMJeio7twLOxgCKnoqi mP6AnHDJfI7sBPaVWMpOqvqVJdXkzPHtabOJBsm4Y2B1s75NsGSBp5Clpjnzd0DFFfj7 l343S+cKo42p2ZX/+I0rl2sgzdPUlmxL85vuQmL9+QQufouPrnRmsEl/fAANOBs2IlTN fEjtBBgK5o4FyV+s2j1LBnKSWnbvusxUUMaVSExw2Pk/fcZLzwS0njR0as4dc3UZIdvc uCzrtwz+o7Kycp6QO3g/lRYOpKxtxtBBfxlXeYmpYvvBYt1ca2GJZl3OeVO4GdsYbKsW o+4w== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from; bh=9rV3hXOR7OX2DXqlbXVZss6xZ+n9BxaLG2UzzXtrs+8=; b=UslZ146kW76pUf3pDh3LKDVN8tFCuRNHiw5u726ubZztkzX+bgvRca1lSWpw7Zeq3n RSOJwPx7tS3Y6GfaMbFEcpFP5BMiTqkYSKoiPl0TPPQpbczGuifKU+oOL+uXJ37WCMbI px2Si5ChKJitmVnijnDlYurE6oYHjihJ6+iEZu+NI/ZV8duQXIyJU/ZMfDPDQl4+XY+n JsuOg3zDX8A0U7+uwwqmLFBJhHbufG57GYVh6QPUi5bjojqHUtqpNDNJYyMKr4q3mRw3 DVkbu7+NDxq2/aS2CWtnv8nuK6Krplx7MN1Tvqs2uHJJFXvjua8gRlf5RBipNh+uc9oI tH5w== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id w185si26385055pgd.518.2019.01.09.15.55.50; Wed, 09 Jan 2019 15:55:50 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726568AbfAIXzt (ORCPT + 31 others); Wed, 9 Jan 2019 18:55:49 -0500 Received: from usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com ([217.140.101.70]:53288 "EHLO foss.arm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726286AbfAIXzs (ORCPT ); Wed, 9 Jan 2019 18:55:48 -0500 Received: from usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (unknown [10.72.51.249]) by usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 27E7CA78; Wed, 9 Jan 2019 15:55:48 -0800 (PST) Received: from beelzebub.austin.arm.com (beelzebub.austin.arm.com [10.118.12.119]) by usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 7F47F3F5AF; Wed, 9 Jan 2019 15:55:47 -0800 (PST) From: Jeremy Linton To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: catalin.marinas@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com, marc.zyngier@arm.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com, dave.martin@arm.com, shankerd@codeaurora.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, ykaukab@suse.de, julien.thierry@arm.com, mlangsdo@redhat.com, steven.price@arm.com, stefan.wahren@i2se.com, Jeremy Linton Subject: [PATCH v3 0/7] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2019 17:55:37 -0600 Message-Id: <20190109235544.2992426-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.2 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Arm64 machines should be displaying a human readable vulnerability status to speculative execution attacks in /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities This series enables that behavior by providing the expected functions. Those functions expose the cpu errata and feature states, as well as whether firmware is responding appropriately to display the overall machine status. This means that in a heterogeneous machine we will only claim the machine is mitigated or safe if we are confident all booted cores are safe or mitigated. v2->v3: Remove "Unknown" states, replace with further blacklists and default vulnerable/no affected states. Add the ability for an arch port to selectively export sysfs vulnerabilities. v1->v2: Add "Unknown" state to ABI/testing docs. Minor tweaks. Jeremy Linton (4): sysfs/cpu: Allow individual architectures to select vulnerabilities arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v2 arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass Mian Yousaf Kaukab (3): arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v1 arm64: kpti: move check for non-vulnerable CPUs to a function arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 126 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 45 +++++++++--- drivers/base/cpu.c | 19 +++++ include/linux/cpu.h | 7 ++ 5 files changed, 185 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) -- 2.17.2