From patchwork Wed Jan 27 09:38:22 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Juergen Gross X-Patchwork-Id: 372355 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.7 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A1D88C433E9 for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 09:41:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 69B572076B for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 09:41:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234856AbhA0Jkw (ORCPT ); Wed, 27 Jan 2021 04:40:52 -0500 Received: from mx2.suse.de ([195.135.220.15]:46712 "EHLO mx2.suse.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234871AbhA0JjM (ORCPT ); Wed, 27 Jan 2021 04:39:12 -0500 X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at test-mx.suse.de DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=suse.com; s=susede1; t=1611740304; h=from:from:reply-to:date:date:message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc: mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding; bh=R3PWSOk1QE9v1GpOIHb/NnNGs7W5QhxGQA5YD3vuLm4=; b=rlTPArEzklGezseesPPFjz4F1fJwPjR1KNQkEVUkSvvakuCt4EZel4JI/VgNArul7YKey2 Pp86uNd24R9Modq30iF0Zmo7Kz/apPZ+jc6sP6CTSP0f5d8tx4gE7RH/zxBh/J3KVq2SdF G8RoOYcWZXVGjsY8G0qpjPGOYvcOjtw= Received: from relay2.suse.de (unknown [195.135.221.27]) by mx2.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id 970ABADA2; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 09:38:24 +0000 (UTC) From: Juergen Gross To: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Juergen Gross , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , "H. Peter Anvin" , Boris Ostrovsky , Stefano Stabellini , stable@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v2] x86/xen: avoid warning in Xen pv guest with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT enabled Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2021 10:38:22 +0100 Message-Id: <20210127093822.18570-1-jgross@suse.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org When booting a kernel which has been built with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT enabled as a Xen pv guest a warning is issued for each processor: [ 5.964347] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 5.968314] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at /home/gross/linux/head/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c:660 get_trap_addr+0x59/0x90 [ 5.972321] Modules linked in: [ 5.976313] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 5.11.0-rc5-default #75 [ 5.980313] Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 9020/0PC5F7, BIOS A05 12/05/2013 [ 5.984313] RIP: e030:get_trap_addr+0x59/0x90 [ 5.988313] Code: 42 10 83 f0 01 85 f6 74 04 84 c0 75 1d b8 01 00 00 00 c3 48 3d 00 80 83 82 72 08 48 3d 20 81 83 82 72 0c b8 01 00 00 00 eb db <0f> 0b 31 c0 c3 48 2d 00 80 83 82 48 ba 72 1c c7 71 1c c7 71 1c 48 [ 5.992313] RSP: e02b:ffffc90040033d38 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 5.996313] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffffff82a141d0 RCX: ffffffff8222ec38 [ 6.000312] RDX: ffffffff8222ec38 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: ffffc90040033d40 [ 6.004313] RBP: ffff8881003984a0 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: ffff888100398000 [ 6.008312] R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffffc90040246000 R12: ffff8884082182a8 [ 6.012313] R13: 0000000000000100 R14: 000000000000001d R15: ffff8881003982d0 [ 6.016316] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888408200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 6.020313] CS: e030 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 6.024313] CR2: ffffc900020ef000 CR3: 000000000220a000 CR4: 0000000000050660 [ 6.028314] Call Trace: [ 6.032313] cvt_gate_to_trap.part.7+0x3f/0x90 [ 6.036313] ? asm_exc_double_fault+0x30/0x30 [ 6.040313] xen_convert_trap_info+0x87/0xd0 [ 6.044313] xen_pv_cpu_up+0x17a/0x450 [ 6.048313] bringup_cpu+0x2b/0xc0 [ 6.052313] ? cpus_read_trylock+0x50/0x50 [ 6.056313] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x80/0x4c0 [ 6.060313] _cpu_up+0xa7/0x140 [ 6.064313] cpu_up+0x98/0xd0 [ 6.068313] bringup_nonboot_cpus+0x4f/0x60 [ 6.072313] smp_init+0x26/0x79 [ 6.076313] kernel_init_freeable+0x103/0x258 [ 6.080313] ? rest_init+0xd0/0xd0 [ 6.084313] kernel_init+0xa/0x110 [ 6.088313] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 6.092313] ---[ end trace be9ecf17dceeb4f3 ]--- Reason is that there is no Xen pv trap entry for X86_TRAP_VC. Fix that by adding a generic trap handler for unknown traps and wire all unknown bare metal handlers to this generic handler, which will just panic the system in case such a trap will ever happen. Fixes: 0786138c78e793 ("x86/sev-es: Add a Runtime #VC Exception Handler") Cc: # v5.10 Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross --- V2: - use generic handler for unknown traps (Andrew Cooper) --- arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 1 + arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c | 14 +++++++++++++- arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S | 1 + 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h index 247a60a47331..f656aabd1545 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h @@ -613,6 +613,7 @@ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_VC(X86_TRAP_VC, exc_vmm_communication); #ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV DECLARE_IDTENTRY_XENCB(X86_TRAP_OTHER, exc_xen_hypervisor_callback); +DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW(X86_TRAP_OTHER, exc_xen_unknown_trap); #endif /* Device interrupts common/spurious */ diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c index 4409306364dc..ca5ac10fcbf7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c @@ -583,6 +583,12 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(xenpv_exc_debug) exc_debug(regs); } +DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_xen_unknown_trap) +{ + /* This should never happen and there is no way to handle it. */ + panic("Unknown trap in Xen PV mode."); +} + struct trap_array_entry { void (*orig)(void); void (*xen)(void); @@ -631,6 +637,7 @@ static bool __ref get_trap_addr(void **addr, unsigned int ist) { unsigned int nr; bool ist_okay = false; + bool found = false; /* * Replace trap handler addresses by Xen specific ones. @@ -645,6 +652,7 @@ static bool __ref get_trap_addr(void **addr, unsigned int ist) if (*addr == entry->orig) { *addr = entry->xen; ist_okay = entry->ist_okay; + found = true; break; } } @@ -655,9 +663,13 @@ static bool __ref get_trap_addr(void **addr, unsigned int ist) nr = (*addr - (void *)early_idt_handler_array[0]) / EARLY_IDT_HANDLER_SIZE; *addr = (void *)xen_early_idt_handler_array[nr]; + found = true; } - if (WARN_ON(ist != 0 && !ist_okay)) + if (!found) + *addr = (void *)xen_asm_exc_xen_unknown_trap; + + if (WARN_ON(found && ist != 0 && !ist_okay)) return false; return true; diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S index 1cb0e84b9161..53cf8aa35032 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S @@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ xen_pv_trap asm_exc_simd_coprocessor_error #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION xen_pv_trap entry_INT80_compat #endif +xen_pv_trap asm_exc_xen_unknown_trap xen_pv_trap asm_exc_xen_hypervisor_callback __INIT