From patchwork Wed Jan 12 01:46:48 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Xiubo Li X-Patchwork-Id: 531992 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5893AC433EF for ; Wed, 12 Jan 2022 01:47:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1347952AbiALBrj (ORCPT ); Tue, 11 Jan 2022 20:47:39 -0500 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com ([170.10.129.124]:41074 "EHLO us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232013AbiALBri (ORCPT ); Tue, 11 Jan 2022 20:47:38 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1641952058; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding; bh=tjMoi0mkkUqIK4zzHLiXm9/lIlxJHNX4TlgPaVSHCaU=; b=De+4JxNN1x7OYwYnZr7igrcOS9z1KZSzg9iYsWrhXSqxadgUt1Z4ipQmBhOGxdcKMNohq2 JG2Cm3GP33zQUz/8hexLmz3WMUegmbLhfRmYmOxx7QrJAHnjn5CKJ90r8kMpdZ/8eDn51L HPByYF+AvuoClBbC+yBA1m+dwCkWyPE= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-325-_XBxxsYiNQmvOWFcb93r1A-1; Tue, 11 Jan 2022 20:47:34 -0500 X-MC-Unique: _XBxxsYiNQmvOWFcb93r1A-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx02.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.12]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 851E71083F61; Wed, 12 Jan 2022 01:47:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lxbceph1.gsslab.pek2.redhat.com (unknown [10.72.47.117]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 454F378DCF; Wed, 12 Jan 2022 01:47:30 +0000 (UTC) From: xiubli@redhat.com To: jlayton@kernel.org Cc: idryomov@gmail.com, vshankar@redhat.com, ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, Xiubo Li Subject: [PATCH v8] ceph: add truncate size handling support for fscrypt Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2022 09:46:48 +0800 Message-Id: <20220112014648.486071-1-xiubli@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.12 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org From: Xiubo Li This will transfer the encrypted last block contents to the MDS along with the truncate request only when the new size is smaller and not aligned to the fscrypt BLOCK size. When the last block is located in the file hole, the truncate request will only contain the header. The MDS could fail to do the truncate if there has another client or process has already updated the RADOS object which contains the last block, and will return -EAGAIN, then the kclient needs to retry it. The RMW will take around 50ms, and will let it retry 20 times for now. Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton --- Hi Jeff, This version is based your new 'wip-fscrypt' branch in ceph-client tree, there has no conflict and you can just replace it directly if this version is okay. And I have updated the ceph PR too. Changed in V8: - Switched the object version to inode->i_version. Changed in V7: - Fixed the sparse check warnings. - Removed the include/linux/ceph/crypto.h header file. Changed in V6: - Fixed the file hole bug, also have updated the MDS side PR. - Add add object version support for sync read in #8. Changed in V5: - Rebase to "wip-fscrypt-fnames" branch in ceph-client.git repo. - Pick up 5 patches from Jeff's "ceph-fscrypt-size-experimental" branch in linux.git repo. - Add "i_truncate_pagecache_size" member support in ceph_inode_info struct, this will be used to truncate the pagecache only in kclient side, because the "i_truncate_size" will always be aligned to BLOCK SIZE. In fscrypt case we need to use the real size to truncate the pagecache. Changed in V4: - Retry the truncate request by 20 times before fail it with -EAGAIN. - Remove the "fill_last_block" label and move the code to else branch. - Remove the #3 patch, which has already been sent out separately, in V3 series. - Improve some comments in the code. Changed in V3: - Fix possibly corrupting the file just before the MDS acquires the xlock for FILE lock, another client has updated it. - Flush the pagecache buffer before reading the last block for the when filling the truncate request. - Some other minore fixes. fs/ceph/crypto.h | 21 +++++ fs/ceph/inode.c | 210 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- fs/ceph/super.h | 5 ++ 3 files changed, 222 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.h b/fs/ceph/crypto.h index b5d360085fe8..7f68bd2e71f9 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.h +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.h @@ -25,6 +25,27 @@ struct ceph_fname { u32 ctext_len; // length of crypttext }; +/* + * Header for the crypted file when truncating the size, this + * will be sent to MDS, and the MDS will update the encrypted + * last block and then truncate the size. + */ +struct ceph_fscrypt_truncate_size_header { + __u8 ver; + __u8 compat; + + /* + * It will be sizeof(assert_ver + file_offset + block_size) + * if the last block is empty when it's located in a file + * hole. Or the data_len will plus CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE. + */ + __le32 data_len; + + __le64 change_attr; + __le64 file_offset; + __le32 block_size; +} __packed; + struct ceph_fscrypt_auth { __le32 cfa_version; __le32 cfa_blob_len; diff --git a/fs/ceph/inode.c b/fs/ceph/inode.c index 2497306eef58..7ec48ff1399a 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/inode.c +++ b/fs/ceph/inode.c @@ -586,6 +586,7 @@ struct inode *ceph_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb) ci->i_truncate_seq = 0; ci->i_truncate_size = 0; ci->i_truncate_pending = 0; + ci->i_truncate_pagecache_size = 0; ci->i_max_size = 0; ci->i_reported_size = 0; @@ -759,6 +760,10 @@ int ceph_fill_file_size(struct inode *inode, int issued, dout("truncate_size %lld -> %llu\n", ci->i_truncate_size, truncate_size); ci->i_truncate_size = truncate_size; + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) + ci->i_truncate_pagecache_size = size; + else + ci->i_truncate_pagecache_size = truncate_size; } return queue_trunc; } @@ -1015,7 +1020,7 @@ int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, if (new_version || (new_issued & (CEPH_CAP_ANY_FILE_RD | CEPH_CAP_ANY_FILE_WR))) { - u64 size = info->size; + u64 size = le64_to_cpu(info->size); s64 old_pool = ci->i_layout.pool_id; struct ceph_string *old_ns; @@ -1030,16 +1035,20 @@ int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, pool_ns = old_ns; if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && size && - (iinfo->fscrypt_file_len == sizeof(__le64))) { - size = __le64_to_cpu(*(__le64 *)iinfo->fscrypt_file); - if (info->size != round_up(size, CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE)) - pr_warn("size=%llu fscrypt_file=%llu\n", info->size, size); + (iinfo->fscrypt_file_len >= sizeof(__le64))) { + u64 fsize = __le64_to_cpu(*(__le64 *)iinfo->fscrypt_file); + if (fsize) { + size = fsize; + if (le64_to_cpu(info->size) != + round_up(size, CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE)) + pr_warn("size=%llu fscrypt_file=%llu\n", + info->size, size); + } } queue_trunc = ceph_fill_file_size(inode, issued, le32_to_cpu(info->truncate_seq), - le64_to_cpu(info->truncate_size), - le64_to_cpu(size)); + le64_to_cpu(info->truncate_size), size); /* only update max_size on auth cap */ if ((info->cap.flags & CEPH_CAP_FLAG_AUTH) && ci->i_max_size != le64_to_cpu(info->max_size)) { @@ -2153,7 +2162,7 @@ void __ceph_do_pending_vmtruncate(struct inode *inode) /* there should be no reader or writer */ WARN_ON_ONCE(ci->i_rd_ref || ci->i_wr_ref); - to = ci->i_truncate_size; + to = ci->i_truncate_pagecache_size; wrbuffer_refs = ci->i_wrbuffer_ref; dout("__do_pending_vmtruncate %p (%d) to %lld\n", inode, ci->i_truncate_pending, to); @@ -2163,7 +2172,7 @@ void __ceph_do_pending_vmtruncate(struct inode *inode) truncate_pagecache(inode, to); spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); - if (to == ci->i_truncate_size) { + if (to == ci->i_truncate_pagecache_size) { ci->i_truncate_pending = 0; finish = 1; } @@ -2244,6 +2253,136 @@ static const struct inode_operations ceph_encrypted_symlink_iops = { .listxattr = ceph_listxattr, }; +/* + * Transfer the encrypted last block to the MDS and the MDS + * will help update it when truncating a smaller size. + * + * We don't support a PAGE_SIZE that is smaller than the + * CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE. + */ +static int fill_fscrypt_truncate(struct inode *inode, + struct ceph_mds_request *req, + struct iattr *attr) +{ + struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); + int boff = attr->ia_size % CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE; + loff_t pos, orig_pos = round_down(attr->ia_size, CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE); + u64 block = orig_pos >> CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SHIFT; + struct ceph_pagelist *pagelist = NULL; + struct kvec iov; + struct iov_iter iter; + struct page *page = NULL; + struct ceph_fscrypt_truncate_size_header header; + int retry_op = 0; + int len = CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE; + loff_t i_size = i_size_read(inode); + int got, ret, issued; + u64 objver; + + ret = __ceph_get_caps(inode, NULL, CEPH_CAP_FILE_RD, 0, -1, &got); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + issued = __ceph_caps_issued(ci, NULL); + + dout("%s size %lld -> %lld got cap refs on %s, issued %s\n", __func__, + i_size, attr->ia_size, ceph_cap_string(got), + ceph_cap_string(issued)); + + /* Try to writeback the dirty pagecaches */ + if (issued & (CEPH_CAP_FILE_BUFFER)) + filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping); + + page = __page_cache_alloc(GFP_KERNEL); + if (page == NULL) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + pagelist = ceph_pagelist_alloc(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pagelist) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + iov.iov_base = kmap_local_page(page); + iov.iov_len = len; + iov_iter_kvec(&iter, READ, &iov, 1, len); + + pos = orig_pos; + ret = __ceph_sync_read(inode, &pos, &iter, &retry_op, &objver); + ceph_put_cap_refs(ci, got); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + /* Insert the header first */ + header.ver = 1; + header.compat = 1; + header.change_attr = cpu_to_le64(inode_peek_iversion_raw(inode)); + + /* + * Always set the block_size to CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE, + * because in MDS it may need this to do the truncate. + */ + header.block_size = cpu_to_le32(CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE); + + /* + * If we hit a hole here, we should just skip filling + * the fscrypt for the request, because once the fscrypt + * is enabled, the file will be split into many blocks + * with the size of CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE, if there + * has a hole, the hole size should be multiple of block + * size. + * + * If the Rados object doesn't exist, it will be set to 0. + */ + if (!objver) { + dout("%s hit hole, ppos %lld < size %lld\n", __func__, + pos, i_size); + + header.data_len = cpu_to_le32(8 + 8 + 4); + header.file_offset = 0; + ret = 0; + } else { + header.data_len = cpu_to_le32(8 + 8 + 4 + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE); + header.file_offset = cpu_to_le64(orig_pos); + + /* truncate and zero out the extra contents for the last block */ + memset(iov.iov_base + boff, 0, PAGE_SIZE - boff); + + /* encrypt the last block */ + ret = ceph_fscrypt_encrypt_block_inplace(inode, page, + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE, + 0, block, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (ret) + goto out; + } + + /* Insert the header */ + ret = ceph_pagelist_append(pagelist, &header, sizeof(header)); + if (ret) + goto out; + + if (header.block_size) { + /* Append the last block contents to pagelist */ + ret = ceph_pagelist_append(pagelist, iov.iov_base, + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE); + if (ret) + goto out; + } + req->r_pagelist = pagelist; +out: + dout("%s %p size dropping cap refs on %s\n", __func__, + inode, ceph_cap_string(got)); + kunmap_local(iov.iov_base); + if (page) + __free_pages(page, 0); + if (ret && pagelist) + ceph_pagelist_release(pagelist); + return ret; +} + int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr, struct ceph_iattr *cia) { struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); @@ -2251,13 +2390,17 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr, struct ceph_iattr *c struct ceph_mds_request *req; struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = ceph_sb_to_client(inode->i_sb)->mdsc; struct ceph_cap_flush *prealloc_cf; + loff_t isize = i_size_read(inode); int issued; int release = 0, dirtied = 0; int mask = 0; int err = 0; int inode_dirty_flags = 0; bool lock_snap_rwsem = false; + bool fill_fscrypt; + int truncate_retry = 20; /* The RMW will take around 50ms */ +retry: prealloc_cf = ceph_alloc_cap_flush(); if (!prealloc_cf) return -ENOMEM; @@ -2269,6 +2412,7 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr, struct ceph_iattr *c return PTR_ERR(req); } + fill_fscrypt = false; spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); issued = __ceph_caps_issued(ci, NULL); @@ -2390,10 +2534,27 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr, struct ceph_iattr *c } } if (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) { - loff_t isize = i_size_read(inode); - dout("setattr %p size %lld -> %lld\n", inode, isize, attr->ia_size); - if ((issued & CEPH_CAP_FILE_EXCL) && attr->ia_size >= isize) { + /* + * Only when the new size is smaller and not aligned to + * CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE will the RMW is needed. + */ + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && attr->ia_size < isize && + (attr->ia_size % CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE)) { + mask |= CEPH_SETATTR_SIZE; + release |= CEPH_CAP_FILE_SHARED | CEPH_CAP_FILE_EXCL | + CEPH_CAP_FILE_RD | CEPH_CAP_FILE_WR; + set_bit(CEPH_MDS_R_FSCRYPT_FILE, &req->r_req_flags); + mask |= CEPH_SETATTR_FSCRYPT_FILE; + req->r_args.setattr.size = + cpu_to_le64(round_up(attr->ia_size, + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE)); + req->r_args.setattr.old_size = + cpu_to_le64(round_up(isize, + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE)); + req->r_fscrypt_file = attr->ia_size; + fill_fscrypt = true; + } else if ((issued & CEPH_CAP_FILE_EXCL) && attr->ia_size >= isize) { if (attr->ia_size > isize) { i_size_write(inode, attr->ia_size); inode->i_blocks = calc_inode_blocks(attr->ia_size); @@ -2416,7 +2577,6 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr, struct ceph_iattr *c cpu_to_le64(round_up(isize, CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE)); req->r_fscrypt_file = attr->ia_size; - /* FIXME: client must zero out any partial blocks! */ } else { req->r_args.setattr.size = cpu_to_le64(attr->ia_size); req->r_args.setattr.old_size = cpu_to_le64(isize); @@ -2482,8 +2642,10 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr, struct ceph_iattr *c release &= issued; spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); - if (lock_snap_rwsem) + if (lock_snap_rwsem) { up_read(&mdsc->snap_rwsem); + lock_snap_rwsem = false; + } if (inode_dirty_flags) __mark_inode_dirty(inode, inode_dirty_flags); @@ -2495,7 +2657,27 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr, struct ceph_iattr *c req->r_args.setattr.mask = cpu_to_le32(mask); req->r_num_caps = 1; req->r_stamp = attr->ia_ctime; + if (fill_fscrypt) { + err = fill_fscrypt_truncate(inode, req, attr); + if (err) + goto out; + } + + /* + * The truncate request will return -EAGAIN when the + * last block has been updated just before the MDS + * successfully gets the xlock for the FILE lock. To + * avoid corrupting the file contents we need to retry + * it. + */ err = ceph_mdsc_do_request(mdsc, NULL, req); + if (err == -EAGAIN && truncate_retry--) { + dout("setattr %p result=%d (%s locally, %d remote), retry it!\n", + inode, err, ceph_cap_string(dirtied), mask); + ceph_mdsc_put_request(req); + ceph_free_cap_flush(prealloc_cf); + goto retry; + } } out: dout("setattr %p result=%d (%s locally, %d remote)\n", inode, err, diff --git a/fs/ceph/super.h b/fs/ceph/super.h index 4d2ccb51fe61..cd4a83fcbc0f 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/super.h +++ b/fs/ceph/super.h @@ -410,6 +410,11 @@ struct ceph_inode_info { u32 i_truncate_seq; /* last truncate to smaller size */ u64 i_truncate_size; /* and the size we last truncated down to */ int i_truncate_pending; /* still need to call vmtruncate */ + /* + * For none fscrypt case it equals to i_truncate_size or it will + * equals to fscrypt_file_size + */ + u64 i_truncate_pagecache_size; u64 i_max_size; /* max file size authorized by mds */ u64 i_reported_size; /* (max_)size reported to or requested of mds */